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The Functions of Literature and the
Evolution of Extended Mind
Nancy Easterlin

G

iven the current climate of higher education, the question
of the usefulness of literature is pressing. As the United States
moves inexorably toward a practical notion of the university’s mission, all of the humanities, and perhaps most particularly arts-centered
disciplines in state-funded systems, have to fight for their survival. Without
doubt, this is, at present, a losing battle. However, the urgency of this
matter may obscure the fact that conceptions of literature’s use have
varied considerably, not only over several thousand years of aesthetic
theory, but within the much shorter span—about a hundred and fifty
years—of the institutionalization of literary studies. According to Gerald
Graff, “The typical American college [in the early nineteenth-century]
was a quasimonastic institution where ‘the preparation of individuals
for Christian leadership and the ministry’ . . . was considered a more
important goal than the advancement of knowledge.”1 If university education in the first half of the nineteenth century functioned primarily to
cultivate a male social elite, and if language and literary study thus came
to serve a central role in reproducing a patriarchal, classist hierarchy,
those values have, most assuredly, lost luster over time.
Understandably, literary scholars are dismayed by the narrow instrumentalism now organizing the agenda of higher education. At the
same time, glancing back over the formation of English studies, one
observes that values often utterly divorced from intellectual objectives
have driven the formation of the field. As values shifted considerably in
the twentieth century, they formed a catalyst—or are perceived to form
a catalyst—for the main theoretical movements influencing American
literary scholarship. Although New Critical methodology was quasiscientific, introducing a focus on the literary object through the method
of close reading, its theoretical expressions encouraged severing the
text from life and history, in the process reifying nineteenth-century
spiritual values through insistence on the irreducibility of the organically
unified work. In reaction to New Criticism’s isolationism, approaches in
the seventies were influenced by sociopolitical movements, including
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Marxism, feminism, postcolonialism, and, slightly later, ecology. Concurrently, those approaches inspired by structuralism and poststructuralism
particularly stressed the power of language and discourse. Yet in spite of
this renewed connection between literature and the social sphere and
the emphasis on its linguistic medium, in recent decades literary studies
has continued to drift toward the margin of the academy.
The dominance of values as a motivating factor for theoretical and
critical developments also harks back to institutional origins, because it
derives from nineteenth-century ambivalence about the place of science
in the humanities. This ambivalence, and its fundamental expression
in the culture wars, has not been kind to literary studies.2 Cast as the
competitor to poetry by the Romantic era, science focuses on different
objects from literary studies, and thus might likely require different
methods and goals, but this is no reason to assume that verified scientific
findings have no epistemic legitimacy in the humanities. In fact, some
of these findings have direct bearing on the question of literature’s use
or function.
Because literature and the other arts are highly complex cultural
products, their potential for various legitimate uses is great. For present
purposes, I will narrow my discussion down initially to a consideration
of the evolved function of art, because attention to the origins of a
phenomenon typically illuminates the question of its use. Furthermore,
because evolutionary social science is specifically concerned with the
function of traits, it compels us to ask: why do we have literature at all?
The theory of evolution by natural selection is corroborated by fossil
findings and the study of living organisms. Not all evolutionary hypotheses can be proven, or proven easily, such as those that apply to mind,
complex behaviors, and cultural artifacts, for which there cannot be
hard evidence. But the framing hypothesis for these more speculative
investigations is quite robust. Concerned with survival, evolutionary
theory focuses on the functional value of species traits, since organisms
that have the physical, psychical, and behavioral traits “designed” to
help them operate efficiently in their environments will endure. Traits
that require significant investments of time and physiological effort,
such as bipedal locomotion, are “expensive” in evolutionary terms, and
the puzzle of their selective advantage is particularly intriguing. Art
behaviors, such as the production, distribution, and consumption of
literary artifacts, are enormously expensive. Most evolutionary scholars
take the view that, given their costliness, the arts must contribute to human survival, although a few propose that art is a by-product of other
mechanisms and behaviors.3
If the arts have contributed to human survival over the course of
evolution, it is likely that they still do so, and if they have had such a

663

the functions of literature

fundamental role in the shaping and continuity of our species, then
the marginalization of literature and other arts today seems grotesquely
ill-advised. My argument for the central importance of the arts in human cultural evolution has several stages. Although critics in the past
two centuries have argued over the usefulness of literature, the longer
critical tradition evinces a persistent concern with the pragmatic function of literary art. Attention to the prehistory of aesthetic practices
reveals that such consideration of function is well placed. The arts, in
all their diversity of forms, are not mere ornaments braided into the
evolution of human culture. Rather, they are a central feature of the
psychological forces propelling its development. Notwithstanding shifts
in what constitutes “art” and its role in social life since the advent of
modernization, both the core features and the experience of the aesthetic remain surprisingly consistent throughout human prehistory and
history and manifest themselves as a distinct, special form of the impulse
shaping culture: the need to control experience as opposed to being
acted upon by external circumstances. Written literature, compared to
the other arts, is an extremely recent phenomenon, and it attests to
the generalized need to shape and control that marks all art. But it is
also much more than this. As text or film (in book, electronic form,
or visual media) stored and available for retrieval outside the brain, it
is a special contribution to external memory and extended mind, one
that functions to engage us with imaginative interpretations of an ever
more complex reality.

I
Apprehensions about bringing a scientific perspective to bear on the
arts have several dimensions. There is, for example, the fear that a history of applying scientific knowledge to industrial production, which
emerged about two hundred years ago with utilitarianism as both an
organized philosophy and emergent cultural attitude, necessarily entails superimposing a mechanistic notion of “utility” on all forms of
human endeavor. A rationalistic concept of “use” inevitably leads to a
crude rather than clarifying reductionism, so anxieties that an evolutionary perspective will diminish the arts are hardly trivial.4 However,
by broadening our view of terms like “function” and “use” beyond a
limited, rationalistic framework inherited from the Enlightenment, I
hope to show that a cognitive-evolutionary perspective illuminates the
significance of art behaviors. Whereas utilitarian philosophy and much
Enlightenment science are inimical to such behaviors, which can only
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seem superfluous from a rationalistic perspective, the Enlightenment
also led paradoxically in an opposite direction, away from reductionism
and toward a recognition of the operations of chance, complexity, and
the interrelatedness of phenomena embodied in the theory of evolution
by natural selection.
The function or use of literature has, in fact, always been a matter
of primary concern within the critical tradition. In The Mirror and the
Lamp, his seminal 1953 study of the critical tradition, M. H. Abrams
identifies four dominant coordinates of art criticism—the universe, the
audience, the artist, and the work—each corresponding to a particular
theoretical emphasis.5 As Abrams demonstrates, although individual
theories may be placed clearly within one of the four basic categories
corresponding to these coordinates—mimetic, pragmatic, expressive,
or objective—no theory or critical approach resides purely within one
of the four groupings. Each basic tendency is historically related to the
other three and conditioned by the emphases of preceding theories.
Moreover, the internal dynamics of any given theory typically account
for all four coordinates to a certain degree. For instance, although
Abrams categorizes Samuel Johnson’s theory as predominantly mimetic
and William Wordsworth’s as expressive, he points out that the romantic poet “was quite in agreement with Johnson that the poet properly
concerns himself with the general and uniform elements, passions, and
language of human nature; he merely differed in regard to the place
these qualities are best exemplified in real life.”6 Despite divergent views
about what is the proper object of imitation, and despite an orientation
toward other coordinates of art behaviors, then, both theories have a
recognizably mimetic component.
By the same token, although Wordsworth and other Romantic-era
poets champion the role of the poet, they generally do so with the
ultimate goal of producing (or reproducing) a specific effect on the
audience.7 Since Abrams defines a pragmatic theory as one that “looks
at the work of art chiefly as a means to an end, an instrument for getting
something done, and tends to judge its value according to its success in
achieving that aim,” it might be argued that this typifies Wordsworth’s
approach as well as Johnson’s.8 The goal or aim of aesthetic engagement,
in other words, is a primary concern of early criticism. On the whole,
the emphasis on the poet-as-legislator in Romantic theory led critics to
mistakenly assume that the movement endorses subjective expression,
“the spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings,” for its own sake.9 However, an attentive reading of Wordsworth’s discussion of the process of
poetic production reveals that the emotions to be expressed are of value
because of their universal importance, determined by a poet who has
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experienced them repeatedly and“[has] thought long and deeply,” and,
moreover, that the subjects and feelings manifest in the work of such a
meditative poet are valuable for their capacity to transform the reader.
Thus, as the poet creates poetry by associating current feelings with the
ideas resulting from past feelings, “[he] shall describe objects and utter
sentiments of such a nature and in such connection with each other,
that the understanding of the being to whom [he addresses himself],
if he be in a healthful state of association, must necessarily be in some
degree enlightened, his taste exalted, and his affections ameliorated.”10
Wordsworth’s emphasis on the reenactment of the poet’s psychological
process in the reader, in sum, is of a piece with his insistence that the
poems he presents have a “worthy purpose,” and it is therefore in its
own way no less aimed at educating the reader than are neoclassical
perspectives, though the methods of poetical instruction take different
form. The poet’s stress on psychological process and shaping of the human psyche as a pedagogical tool—his practice of teaching by indirection—parallels the rise of psychology as a discipline and simultaneously
illustrates a modern understanding of how people learn.
All told, granting the differing orientations in aesthetic theories from
the classical tradition onward, pragmatic considerations nearly always
come into play. For example, underlying much of the debate about duration and unity of the work from Aristotle up through the eighteenth
century are differing views of the impact on the audience. Aristotle’s
preference for tragedy’s shorter span in comparison with the epic and
his approval of the unities was undergirded by a conviction that drama’s
cohesive structure produces catharsis, which leads to the ennoblement
of the individual. Horace turned Aristotle’s observations into rules for
writing, heightening the emphasis on instruction implicit in the Poetics.
Similarly attending to the net effect on the audience, Sidney disparaged sixteenth-century England’s bastard form, the “mingled drama”
(tragicomedy), claiming that the combination of comedy, focused on the
common errors of human life, and tragedy, focused on the uncertainty
of human life and invoking admiration and commiseration, produces
laughter rather than delight. Seventeenth and eighteenth-century English
critics, although influenced by Pierre Corneille’s rule-oriented sense of
decorum, relaxed the strict didactic perspective that tied moral instruction to classical unity. For instance, Dryden’s criticism that the unity
of place destroys verisimilitude signals a turn away from the rules-andmodels aspect of classical theory and presages Johnson’s emphasis on
the representation of truth through general nature and variety, which
he deems conducive to the audience’s moral growth. Different though
the tenor of the Romantic era may be, Shelley’s insistence that poetry
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transforms the reader through sympathetic identification with other
persons underscores a particular impact on the reader, the transformation of social consciousness.
In the instances cited above, how the audience is affected and what
ends are served by the purported effects proves a dominant concern of
the critic. This pragmatic strain throughout the critical tradition, aligned
with Abrams’s second coordinate, the audience, takes new form with the
rise of literacy and psychology. Perhaps already emergent in Dryden’s
preference for verisimilitude, an emphasis on internal audience processes
gains force in the Romantic era. In the first half of the twentieth century,
the Russian formalist Shklovsky focused on the psychological impact of
unusual techniques. And reader response theory takes on new permutations by the late twentieth century, when scholars like Reuven Tsur and
Mark Johnson draw on cognitive and evolutionary psychology to explain
the processes and possible functions of literature. Today, a number of
cognitive evolutionary theorists assume a continuity between the cognitive processes entailed in, and the evolved function of, literature, for the
simple reason that basic mental processes must adequately fit the goal
of long-term survival.11 In sum, a cognitive-evolutionary framework is a
contribution to the evolving pragmatic strain of criticism and theory,
connecting internal reader processes with larger hypotheses about the
function of art at the species level.

II
For several reasons, formulating an evolutionary hypothesis about the
adaptive function of the arts cannot be a simple business. Evolutionary
psychology distinguishes between ultimate and proximate causation, that
is, between the presumed cause of an adaptation in the distant past and
factors in the current environment that elicit behaviors reflecting that
adaptation.12 When human settlements took root about 10,000 years ago,
the advantages and demands of sedentary life accelerated the growth
of human culture and led to a major, long-term transformation of human lifeways. In cultural terms, this transformation to modernism was
gradual, but in evolutionary terms, it was very rapid indeed. Because our
contemporary manner of living differs so dramatically from that of our
ancestors as recently as 30,000 years ago, the original and contemporary
causes of art behaviors are likely to differ.13
This discrepancy is especially evident when one considers the range and
kinds of behavior that are included under the rubric of art. Modernized
human cultures separate the experience of art—art products and the
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behaviors they involve—from day-to-day activities, locating them in the
theatre, the art museum, the opera house, the symphony hall, the dance
hall, the work of imaginative literature, and so on. Within these various
arenas, the arts are experienced as activities distinct from those perceived
to contribute directly to survival. Even today, however, the practice of
setting artifacts aside for special contemplation, a development of the
past one thousand years, is confined to very few societies worldwide.14
By contrast, our species, homo sapiens sapiens, dates to roughly 100,000
years ago, and estimates of the explosion of human culture pinpoint
the Middle to Upper Paleolithic Age, between 60,000 and 30,000 years
ago.15 Over the tens of thousands of years that witnessed the development of human culture, art behaviors were not cordoned off into spheres
removed from everyday, instrumental activities, but were engrained in
other aspects of human life.
Thus, an evolutionary hypothesis about the emergence of the arts—that
is, their ultimate cause—must attend to their integral relationship to the
development of culture. More crucially, such formulations must consider
whether the patterns of making and experiencing that constitute “the
aesthetic” encouraged and accelerated cultural evolution as a response
to problems of survival. If, as the cognitive psychologist Merlin Donald
defines it, culture is “a collective system of knowledge and behavior”
that includes ideas, beliefs, myths, artifacts, and institutions, and if we
agree with those anthropologists and archeologists who identify many
prehistoric cultural forms as art, then the inextricability of art with
belief systems, ideologies, and modes of knowing and doing stands in
relief.16 Some of the best-known material examples of early art include
body adornments, among them beads (some of those found in France
were carved to mimic sea shells), animal teeth, and pendants, dating to
40,000–30,000 years ago; the paintings in Chauvet Cave in the Ardèche
(30,000 years); the lion-man figurine found in Germany (33,000–30,000
years ago); the Lascaux Cave paintings (17,000 years); painted slabs in
southern Africa’s Apollo Cave (27,500 years ago); and wall engravings
in Australia, dating at least to 15,000 years ago, but perhaps as much as
40,000 years old.17 Additionally, there is abundant evidence of nonmaterial art forms in ritual activities (protomusic, protodance, and, eventually,
myth), which were combined in holistic, ritual performances rather than
segmented into separate aesthetic media.
Steven Mithen claims that although evidence of early art appears to
be more prolific in Europe than elsewhere, it is a worldwide phenomenon at this period in human prehistory. Explaining why art remains
absent in some parts of the world until about 20,000 years ago, Mithen
writes: “The variability in the intensity with which art was produced can
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be attributed to variation in economic and social organization, which
in turn can be largely attributed to environmental conditions. The
archaeological record shows us that Stone Age art is not a product of
comfortable circumstances—when people have time on their hands; it
has most often been created when people were living in conditions of
severe stress. The florescence of Paleolithic art in Europe occurred at a
time when environmental conditions were extremely harsh around the
height of the last ice age.”18 Evolutionary, cognitive, and environmental
psychologists generally concur with Mithen’s claim that aesthetic phenomena are not related to leisure time but, to the contrary, to stressful
conditions. If cave paintings were a way of storing information about
sources of food or rival human groups (a primary source of stress),
body adornment may have functioned to disseminate messages to such
groups, perhaps misleading ones. Mithen theorizes that three cognitive
capacities, related to three domains of mind, are critical for the creation
of art: the mental conception of an image, intentional communication,
and attribution of meaning. The emergence of art attests to a transformation in human cognition, a “cognitive explosion” in early modern
humans 60,000–30,000 years ago.
The view that art is a response to challenges to survival harmonizes
with Donald’s as well as other definitions of the more inclusive term
“culture.” The environmental psychologists Stephen and Rachel Kaplan
define culture as a set of consistent patterns for functioning that arises
from the need to control individual and group life and the surrounding
environment. Culture is, then, “a collective system of knowledge and
behavior” that, as Donald emphasizes, functions to extend cognitive
power and lessen the power of our immediate environment. A cultural
context does not simply help solve a problem; it helps define the problem
and shape its solution, providing a coherent understanding and set of
relationships to other people, physical place, and the larger world. As
the Kaplans put it, culture is a map for healthy functioning.19 This line
of thought, then, suggests that culture is much than the product of a
large brain that frees humans from the demands of a delimited habitat
and immediate circumstances. Viewed from an evolutionary perspective,
culture is about enabling control and/or the perception of control,
thereby also increasing the plasticity of human response. Notably, culture
is shot through with aesthetic behaviors. Early aesthetic behaviors include
primitive myths and rituals which, in this light, provide a perception of
control and explain what is fearful.
Like these general definitions of culture as a collective system of knowledge and behavior that constitutes a map for functioning, evolutionary
definitions of “art” and “the aesthetic” emphasize that art is a mode of
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action rather than a series of categories of artifacts. The most dedicated
advocate for an evolutionary definition of the arts, the anthropologist
and art historian Ellen Dissanayake, pointed out in 1988 that it might
be worthwhile to abandon the term “art” altogether, because this word
is tied to an artifact-centered approach. Drawing on recent cognitive
science and philosophy, Dissanayake notes that because classes of things
don’t have precise boundaries, the quest to define essential features
of art phenomena is doomed to frustration.20 Dissanayake defines art
as “making special,” or elaboration beyond the everyday. The human
need to elaborate beyond, not merely to explain, the everyday imposes
a human and civilizing order on nature.21 By doing something that
creates the psychological perception of control, art allays anxiety in
uncertain circumstances and facilitates group cohesion (although this
social function may be reduced, masked, or negated in the atomized
world of modern art practices).
Thus, like the philosopher Denis Dutton, Dissanayake rejects the notion that the origin of the arts requires the separation of ancient and folk
art behaviors from a modern conception of art. In recognizing difference
but stressing continuity, both Dissanayake and Dutton identify features
of art and the aesthetic that they deem key to any efforts to define art.
Dissanayake itemizes several naturalistic features of aesthetic quality,
including accessibility coupled with strikingness, tangible relevance,
evocative resonance, and satisfying fullness.22 Dutton enumerates crosscultural features that “define art in terms of a set of cluster criteria,” most
of which apply to the practices and objects identified as art. Dutton’s
list is significantly longer than Dissanayake’s, but the two lists exhibit
marked similarities. Dutton includes direct pleasure, skill and virtuosity, style, novelty and creativity, criticism, representation, special focus,
expressive individuality, emotional saturation, intellectual challenge, arts
and institutions, and imaginative experience.23 Both theorists attend to
the distinctive features of the art object or event as well as the nature
of the experience it produces. In these accounts, art reveals itself as a
constructed thing that creates novelty and strikingness through selection
from the everyday. Art or “making special” is not directly instrumental,
like digging a trench to prevent flooding inside a settlement or fashioning
a better weapon, but psychically functional, its evocative concentrations
of form and style productive of a special emotional response that is often complemented by criticism and intellectual engagement. Finally, in
all times and places, art behaviors and objects have been part of larger
social institutions and practices.
According to this concept of the arts, which maintains that they are
part of the mental and material apparatus enabling action and control of
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the immediate environment, the aesthetic is fundamentally continuous
with other forms of human experience. The orientation toward continuity
rather than strict demarcation between behaviors and categories coincides with a larger epistemological shift that emphasizes process rather
than categorization and static hierarchy.24 The transition to a dynamic
conception of the universe begins in philosophical and scientific thought
in the eighteenth century, but it gains momentum with the emergence
of Darwinian theory, which, in surmounting earlier evolutionary theories
of life through the concept of natural selection, envisioned descent with
modification as an extraordinarily slow process taking place over vast
spans of time. Darwin himself points out that the distinction between
species and variety, although essentially arbitrary, is employed for the
sake of convenience in grouping similar individuals with one another.25
The theory of evolution by natural selection profoundly influenced
American pragmatic philosophy, leading William James and John Dewey
to criticize the compartmentalization to which intellectual inquiry is so
often prone.26 Nevertheless, while pragmatists were criticizing the psychological fallacy—that of superimposing discrete functional capacities
on the mind and segmenting reality into identifiable components such
as subject, object, and stimulus—the discipline of psychology proceeded
to develop a stimulus-response model of perception and sensation.
(After all, phenomena are more amenable to analysis when they are
broken down into component parts, even when those components
reflect the thinker’s own perceptual-cognitive apparatus rather than
mind-independent entities.) Ecological psychology emerged in the
1960s as a critical response to this trend, claiming that perceptual acts
can only be understood in the context of the environment, and that
the senses operating together form a perceptual system designed to
orient the organism in the environment and facilitate information pick
up. Thus, J. J. Gibson’s theorization fifty years ago of the relationship
of perceptual systems to the constraints of the environment serves as
a precursor to today’s embodiment psychology, which recognizes that
mental processes are in many ways organized and governed by physical
patterns of action and applies neuroscientific methods to investigation
of body-mind processes.27
John Dewey provides an important link between a post-Enlightenment
epistemology that envisions intellectual inquiry in terms of continuity and process and a functional definition of the aesthetic. Whereas
experience in general is a continuous process, in Dewey’s estimation,
“an experience has a unity that gives its name, that meal, that storm,
that rupture of friendship. The existence of this unity is constituted
by a single quality that pervades the entire experience in spite of the
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variation of its constituent parts.”28 Going a step beyond the completed
unity of an everyday “experience,” Dewey defines “the aesthetic” as the
clarification and intensification of an ordinary completed experience
and contends, furthermore, that not only art behaviors but intellectual
experiences can have an aesthetic quality. Both are subject to an internal
integration and fulfillment based on movement or aesthetic structure.
But the arts also differ from a completed, everyday experience. For
example, watching a spectacular sunset provides a sense of unity and
completion, but this experience has not been intentionally shaped with
the goal of eliciting aesthetic response, as has a work of art. In Dewey’s
words, “The doing or making is artistic when the perceived result is of
such a nature that its qualities as perceived have controlled the question
of production.”29 And although intellectual experience may be subject
to such intentionality, it works with abstract signs and symbols rather
than perceptual qualities, as do the arts.

III
The arts are, then, intentionally elaborated behaviors that, via some
kind of product, provide “an experience” through emotionally evocative stylizations (of visual pattern, rhythm and sound, bodily movement,
language use, and the like) that reward both creator and participant
with a perception of control through the combination of accessibility,
novelty, and completeness.
In their many instantiations in human prehistory and the present,
the arts take a variety of distinctive forms. Written literature has several
unusual characteristics, not least its removal from sense experience.
Vision and sound are perhaps the senses chiefly engaged in the experience of the arts, but literary works read silently engage primarily with
memory rather than linking directly to the senses themselves. Several
features of literature suggest that, if it still serves an evolved function,
that function is highly cognitive: its distance from sensory experience,
its correspondingly abstract, cerebral nature, and its mediation through
the complex symbolic system of written language.
Viewed as a representative type of art behavior, written literature, an
extremely recent and cognitively demanding medium, illustrates the
futility, or perhaps simply the wrong-headedness, of trying to pinpoint an
ultimate cause for any specific art behavior or object above and beyond
the propensity to elaborate or “make special.” All of the arts attest to
the human impulse to resist subjection to external circumstances and
to occupy instead what John Tooby and Irven DeVore call “the cognitive
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niche.” This metaphor—the cognitive niche—highlights how the human development of culture, our “collective system of knowledge and
behavior,” differentiates us from other animal species. Whereas most
animal species carve out ecological niches by adapting to distinct habitats, learning to exploit resources and cope with predators in physically
delimited domains, the greater mobility and intelligence of humans that
emerged several million years ago freed them from the known threats
in and dependence on a geographically defined habitat. Able to apply
intelligence to a changing physical surround, humans learned to turn
the unfamiliar to good use, crafting their niche in diverse places via the
benefits of their analytical, interpretive minds.
The emergence of symbolic systems about nine thousand years ago
marks, in Donald’s assessment, a major advance in human cognition.
From the simplest markings on rocks to written text to high-speed computers, humans have created stores of knowledge and information outside
the brain that greatly enhance use of the environment because they solve
the problem of limited short-term memory. Knowledge outside the brain
is stored in the external symbolic storage system (ESS) and constitutes
“external mind,” that is, a nonbiological extension of human mind into
the external environment. Donald claims that the symbol systems and
storage devices of our stage of culture introduce “a hardware change,
albeit a nonbiological hardware change” in human memory. If this claim
seems grandiose, imagine trying to function without the ESS. Phonetic
handwriting, pads and pencils to store that handwriting, computers,
electronic tablets, telephones—these comprise today some of the more
obvious forms of external memory. But how would we function without
streetlights, street signs, traffic signs, and the symbols and words in grocery stores and malls, all of which are components of the ESS? Before
the development of symbolic systems, external memory was extremely
limited, including cultural memories “stored” in other persons, early
arts, trail markings, and so on. The increasing complexity of the ESS is
evident in the sophistication of a government document, a legal brief,
or, indeed, a work of literature. Like other documents that benefit from
the development of phonetic writing, literature attests to the expansion
and externalization of the mind and at the same time augments a very
special kind of mental hardware outside the brain.
What distinctive features of human evolution brought about the
development of complex culture, including the impulse to elaborate
beyond the everyday that would, over time, issue in a specific artworld
comprised of distinct aesthetic media, all attesting to the efflorescence
of external (or extended) mind? Bipedalism, expansion of group size,
increase in territory, sociality, high intelligence, meat eating, and, finally,
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the development of complex language are all dynamically related components of the evolution of a species that has learned to use mind and
the products of mind to make its place in the world. Perhaps the single
most important adaptation, bipedalism provides benefits and exacts costs
that drive the evolution of other features of modern humans, including increased body, brain, and group size. Outlining Peter Wheeler’s
hypothesis that bipedalism evolved to reduce heat stress, Robin Dunbar
points out “that a hairless, bipedal, sweating hominid could have doubled
the distance it travelled on a pint of water compared to a furred quadrupedal one.”30 To the layman, this might sound like a simple savings
in energy and resources but, in fact, in evolutionary terms, it has major
implications, since travelling further means confronting the unfamiliar
which, in turn, demands increased intelligence. Probable migrations
of homo erectus from Africa and Java into Asia almost two million years
ago point to the integral relationship between bipedalism and higher
intelligence. Occurring over vast periods of time, these migrations indicate that individual generations of human ancestors were expanding
their territory size incrementally and repeatedly relocating into more
habitable areas. Therefore, two million years ago humans were reaping
the advantages of bigger brains: with the brainpower to coordinate the
complex mechanics of bipedal bodies and the attendant ability to travel
beyond delimited habitats, early humans had begun to occupy the “cognitive niche,” adapting to new locales by taking advantage of unfamiliar
resources and protecting themselves against new threats.
Although some late twentieth-century literary theoreticians posit the
all-encompassing power of language, the supposition that language
precedes thought and perhaps determines it is fundamentally contradicted by the evidence of evolutionary social science. As Donald
reasons, significant cognitive and cultural changes likely provided the
impetus for language’s evolution: “the main importance of the vocal apparatus does not reside in how it might have enabled speech; in itself,
it couldn’t have. . . . The accompanying conceptual changes are more
basic, and even these formed only part of a larger cultural change.”31
Moreover, the dramatic physiological changes necessary for language
did not emerge under pressure for its evolution, but were probably a
side benefit of the adaptation for bipedal anatomy.32 Upright posture
caused the lengthening of the vocal tract with the lower positioning of
the larynx, consequently enabling increased versatility in vocalizations.
Donald contends that “The primary objects of language and speech are
thematic; their most salient achievements are discourse and symbolic
thought. Words and sentences, lexicons and grammars, would have
become necessary evils, tools that had to be invented to achieve this
higher representational goal. In this view, language would have repre-
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sented not an end in itself but an adaptation that met cognitive and
cultural needs, that is, ultimately for the formalization and unification
of thought and knowledge.”33
In sum, Donald suggests that it was the cognitive drive toward representation and myth formulation that spurred the evolution of language.
Mythic representation initially functioned to explain the organization of
reality, including not only questions of origins but the causes of unpredictable and disastrous events. In drawing the human group together
by explaining uncertainty, myths addressed the problem of survival and,
in so doing, consolidated the group through a story that gave a sense
of psychological control over the environment to individuals as well as
the group as a whole.

IV
The complexity of human biological and cultural evolution supports
the position that a narrowly instrumental view of art is not in keeping
with an evolutionary perspective, much less with contemporary uses of
the arts. According to the evolutionary hypothesis presented here, art
emerged to provide a psychic sense of control and group cohesion in
uncertain circumstances. In my view, this sense of control, often imparted
through pattern and immersion in what Dewey identifies as an intentionally designed, completed experience, is still a seminal aspect of aesthetic
experience.34 But this is a far cry from boiling all of art’s functions, not
to say its uses, down to a perceived control over experience. Art participates in culture, and if culture is “a collective system of knowledge
and behavior” that provides “a map for healthy functioning,” that map
is necessarily a generalized one that incorporates signposted alternative
routes and unmarked trails along with its conventional paths. That is to
say, in keeping with the plasticity of mind that emerged as humans began
to craft the “cognitive niche,” freeing themselves from the vagaries of
the environment, the pattern of human evolution predicts a movement
toward independence of mind and hypothetical thought. Furthermore,
the ESS, which fundamentally enhances human mind by documenting
independent thought and transforming it into shared information, is
the cultural-technological ground zero of written literature. Nonexistent
outside of this storage and retrieval system, literature not only relies on
but amplifies it. Its special use, therefore, is in its function as both an
extension of and contribution to mind, one that expands our capacity
for narrative and metaphorical thought, that augments consciousness,
and that offers hypothetical, interpretable experience.
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Donald claims that with the developments of reading and film, the
mind comes under the control of the ESS: “biological memory is, more
and more, unable to draw on its own experiences without reference
to the ESS.”35 Without symbolic systems, the constraints of short term
memory, even allowing for enhanced memory through the shared, mutually supporting structures of human social groups, limit prospective and
retrospective thought. The increasing refinement and sophistication of
early symbolic systems over about eight thousand years ultimately led
to alphabetic writing, which unites auditory and visuographic cognitive processes. Donald suggests that pictorial representations gradually
evolved into symbols about 8,500 BC in Sumeria. Early symbolic systems,
including accounting systems, lists, and syllabaries (loose collections of
symbols), remained visuographic for many thousands of years, lacking
any correlation with the spoken word. These systems, which required
the memorization of large numbers of symbols, put a high demand on
memory, inevitably limiting literacy and discouraging creativity among
those who used them. The invention of alphabets thus constitutes a
major breakthrough, for alphabetic writing combines visual symbols
with phonetic expression, utilizing a limited number of symbols that are
capable of expressing and storing a broad array of meanings.
Thus, phonetic language and, in time, the printing press, provided
the necessary technology for literary production. However, the cognitive
capacities underlying the techniques most central to literature, such as
figurative expression (including metaphor, metonymy, and synecdoche)
and, most centrally, narrative, are not products of the invention of writing
and speech but long predate them.36 Narrative is a primary, indispensable, and very ancient mode of thought, directly connected to causal
inferencing. In psychological terms, the ability to place persons, objects,
and events in sequences and to infer causal relations constitutes narrative cognition.37 Literary theorists might argue that this sort of day-to-day
narrativity, whereby we walk ourselves through our days—construing our
work and social activities, our family obligations, our negotiations of the
roadways and the swimming pool lanes, our conflicts with coworkers,
our future plans, our memories—that this loose and free-form storymaking, with so many overlapping strands, has little relation to what
literary scholars mean by “narrative.” But literary narrative entails the
selection and/or invention of strands of thought-and-action from this
web of ongoing narrativity. Literary narrative is not separate from, or
other than, the commonplace narrativity that facilitates our understanding of ourselves, others, and events and that enables us to conceive of
ourselves and to behave as agents. Literary narrative is the aestheticized
refinement of the web of everyday narrativity, and it is capable of an
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extraordinary “making special” and an extension of mind because it is
embedded in the ESS.
Furthermore, because the ESS enlarges the human mind beyond the
limits of the physical brain, it likewise supplements and extends consciousness, a process that also relies on narrative cognition. As the most basic
definitions of consciousness reveal, it is entwined with an organism’s
relations in time and space, and thus with contiguity and causality, the
backbone of narrative. In the simplest terms, Antonio Damasio defines
consciousness as “an organism’s awareness of its own self and surroundings” or “a unified mental pattern that brings together the object and
the self.”38 Musing on the origin of consciousness, Damasio links it with
primal forms of narrative thought: the organism “[constructs] an account
of what happens within the organism when the organism interacts with
an object, be it perceived or recalled, be it within body boundaries (e.g.,
pain) or outside them (e.g., a landscape). This account is a simple narrative without words.”39 Thus, the impulse behind the emergence and
persistence of consciousness in the species—to construct a sequential and
causal understanding of self-and-environment—appears closely related
to the strong evidence of narrative thought and action in literature.
Recently, several evolutionary and cognitive theorists have highlighted
an important function of literature, maintaining that narrative simulations provide practice for real-world experience. For instance, the adaptationist literary scholar Joseph Carroll, building on the speculations
of evolutionary biologist E. O. Wilson, proposes a general theory of art
around the concept of scenario building.40 Along the same lines, Lisa
Zunshine insists on the cognitive efficacy of reader projection into hypothetical situations, emphasizing particularly that fiction hones the ability
to glean the beliefs, intentions, and desires of others.41 For example,
following Carroll’s theory, Pat Barker’s Regeneration Trilogy strengthens
and diversifies neural networks via simulated experience of soldiers in
World War I and the doctors who treated them for shell shock. These
neural networks attest to the diversification of cognition via hypothetical
experience. Following Zunshine’s theory, the conversational niceties in
Jane Austen’s novels allow readers to infer the intentions and beliefs of
characters and in the process attune their understanding of the minds
of real persons.
In my view, both theorists point to an important (though not the only)
function of literature in the present day, one that, while not directly
instrumental, is highly useful. Because literary works are intentionally
constructed experiences, they enable readers to engage from a distance
and thus to reflect on events and character psychology from a position
of security. If the evolved function of primitive art was to ensure a sense
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of security and control over experience, then this aspect of art’s ultimate
cause persists in the immersion in imaginative worlds, which allow us
to extend consciousness by drawing on domains where we lack direct
experience. Additionally, the likely cognitive process that facilitated
human control over the environment harmonizes with the theories of
Carroll and Zunshine. Planning and goal-oriented action are signature
features of entry into the cognitive niche, for they are evidence of
prospective and retrospective thinking rather than responses based on
immediate conditions alone. Tooby and DeVore maintain that humans
became capable of performing goal-oriented actions “by conceptually
abstracting from a situation a model.”42 For example, early humans who
remembered patterns of animal migration or feeding routines learned
to place these in a hunting situation model; abstracting from that model,
they were able to act on it pragmatically (when animals moved toward
the water hole at dusk, for instance). In developing situation models,
in short, humans draw on experience-based knowledge and organize it
in rudimentary narrative form. These models, in turn, are cognitively
available as flexible plans for immediate or prospective action. It seems
quite likely, then, that the cognitive skill and complexity brought by
higher cognition ultimately resulted in the evolution of fictional, “as
if” mental products, situation models at a mental remove from reality.
Indeed, evolutionary psychology offers an adaptive explanation for
the emergence of imaginative experience and its indirectly instrumental status, and this too lends weight to the view that literary experience
hones cognitive understanding and may, in some cases, be practically
applicable. Leda Cosmides and John Tooby propose that as our human
ancestors came to inhabit the cognitive niche and simultaneously confronted the complexities of a changing environment, they needed to
sort globally true from contingently true information, and they needed
to reason counterfactually. (It is globally true that all animals die and
rain makes you wet, but only contingently true that small purple-blue
berries are a good food source. It might be true that if your group had
traveled through the woods rather than skirting them, you would have
saved yourselves from overexposure but taken on the risk of unknown
dangers.) Cosmides and Tooby suggest that humans developed the cognitive ability to track true and false information separately, concomitantly
surrendering a naïve realism. In their words, “Managing these new types
of information . . . involved the evolution of new information formats
. . . [and cognitive tagging and tracking of] the boundaries within
which a given set of representations can safely be used for inference or
action.”43 Whereas oral literature is a relatively simple extension of this
cognitive apparatus for simulation, written literature is a quite elaborate
extension of it.
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As the above remarks suggest, theories of literature as scenario building and mind reading have much to offer; however, by themselves they
are biased toward narrative forms and may also tend to literalize the
operations of imaginative texts. The technical ability to encode and store
linguistic constructs results in an endgame with language and form and
indicates these theories do not cover all the bases of literature’s evolved
function. A fascinating irony of written literature is that, once words are
fixed on the page—and thereby entered into the ESS—they are open
to inspection and interpretation. Paradoxically, as words become set in
stone, so to speak, their recorded nature lends itself to a proliferation
of meaning and, in relatively short order, to the construction of new
kinds of texts whose authors intend a proliferation of meanings. At
first blush, this might all seem rather unnatural from an evolutionary
perspective. How can such apparently superflous complexity issue from
an evolutionary function? An organism must make a ready assessment
of its environment and take prompt action. Has a cultural artifact that
revels in interpretive ambiguities severed itself from human nature and
the evolved function of the arts?
Everyday living is an interpretive process, and both in the present
and past it presents us with ambiguities. Literary scholarship has been
hindered by the assumption that meaning-construction is essentially
textual, rather than a fundamental life process that we, to borrow Dissanayake’s terms, make special or elaborate in literary texts. This belief
is, to a great extent, understandable. Because humans in general, like
other organisms, are better served by directing their attention outward
than inward, they are generally not conscious of being continuously
engaged in meaning-making processes. In the interests of survival, as
neuroscientists and philosophers recognize, perception, cognition, and
consciousness are predominantly directed away from the self.44 Additionally, literary scholars in particular are apt to think of meaning as solely a
feature of language, a technology that can both clarify and complicate
semantic procedures. Be that as it may, the construction of meaning is a
routine matter. Noting the movements of the ceiling fans on my balcony,
the quivering magnolia branches outside my window, and the telltale
sheen in the sky, I infer (without turning on the television to confirm my
meanings) that Tropical Storm Karen has approached the Gulf Coast.
As humans entered the cognitive niche and untethered themselves
from the features of delimited locales, they needed to construct new
meanings from the aspects of unfamiliar environments. Thus, over the
course of human evolution, the increasing complexity of meaningconstruction proceeded hand-in-hand with the emergence of higher
intelligence. One great advantage of imaginative literature is that invites
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our powers of meaning construction in a safe domain that allows our
interpretive powers to range freely. But more than this, imaginative
literature makes us conscious of what we automatically tend to forget:
that we are active interpreters of that reality, and that we normally enlist
cognitive procedures that have a general, but certainly not a comprehensive, efficacy.
If art is a mode of action that evolved under challenges to survival,
the abstract nature of written literature constitutes an aesthetic form
suitable to the complexity of human experience under modernization.
Developing as an integral aspect of culture, art offers, as Dewey suggests,
intentionally constructed experience that results in a sense of completion. Conferring a sense of completeness and control, aesthetic experience offers a psychic arena where opportunities for meaning-making
proliferate. This is perhaps particularly true of written literature, since
the abstractions of language sever it from direct sensory experience, and
since language is a symbolic system facilitating interpretive procedures.
In light of Donald’s speculation that language evolved for the unification
of thought and knowledge, the use of literary forms to create complex
significance—and thus to complicate thought and knowledge—suggests that a primary function of literature today is to prevent excessive
unification of thought and knowledge, which cannot serve the needs
of a complex culture.
Pragmatic theories traditionally have ethical implications, as Abrams’s
definition indicates: they “[look] at the work of art chiefly as a means
to an end, an instrument for getting something done, and [tend] to
judge its value according to its success in achieving that aim.” An evolutionary approach to the function of art relieves the critic of the ethical
focus indicated in the tradition, since it begins with a much more basic
question: why do we have literature at all? My remarks in this essay
point to functions that have transformed considerably in their entwined
relation with evolving culture but that are still robust today. One use of
literary studies, as opposed to literature itself, is to increase the efficacy
of meaning-making processes and the conscious awareness of humans
as interpreters of their reality by teaching a rich tradition of literary
works and engaging in communal interpretation. We may even be able
to convince some administrators that what is not directly instrumental
is, nonetheless, a central feature of our species’ survival.
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